



Need to Share

Information exchange and NORAD's new mission.

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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 significantly changed perceptions of the international defense and security environment. These attacks highlighted the need for enhanced cooperation between nations to protect their citizens and their economies. Enhanced cooperation is especially critical for Canada and the United States, two culturally like-minded nations that share an 8,891-kilometer common border, who have a long history of mutual support as friendly neighbors and allies, and whose economies are intertwined more closely than any other two nations in the world.

Our economic integration is our center of gravity, and the main reason that we need closer formal ties in the maritime domain. Although Canada and the United States are each other's largest trading partners, most of our trade with other nations depends upon safe and secure maritime shipping and infrastructure.

The maritime approaches to North America present a defense and security challenge, because more than 95 percent of U.S. overseas trade arrives through U.S. seaports; a staggering 9 million shipping containers enter the U.S. each year, on average, across 41,600 kilometers of commercially navigable waterways and through 361 seaports. Similarly, Canadian ports annually unload more than 1.3 million containers and handle over 300 million tons of cargo; and more than 1,700 vessels per day transit through Canada's Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic waters.¹

Any significant interruption of this trade would result in major economic difficulties for both countries. However, limits in surveillance capabilities and resources result in a large number of vessels operating

within our waters undetected. Hence, information sharing between Canada and the United States is essential to enhancing our combined defense and security.

Context and Problem Identification

The United States National Commission on Terrorism, the Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the 9/11 Commission all provided findings and recommendations on how to improve the American defense and security environment.² As an example, the "9/11 Commission Report"³ found that information that was critical to making informed decisions was not shared among agencies, that there are no penalties for not sharing information, and that most agencies uphold a "need-to-know" culture of information protection rather than promoting a "need-to-share" culture of integration.

The 9/11 Commission identified that technology, or a lack thereof, is not always the issue, observing that "technology produces its best results when an organization has the doctrine, structure, and incentives to exploit it...even the best information technology will not improve information sharing so long as the intelligence agencies' personnel and security systems reward protecting information rather than disseminating it."⁴ Hence, there must be as much emphasis on shared processes as there is on technology.

The information sharing shortcomings found by the 9/11 Commission were similar among some of the Canadian federal agencies. The Canadian Standing

Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD) conducted a study and found that there is:

- greater need for Canada-U.S. coordination;
- slow progress in sharing information;
- lack of surveillance coordination;
- information fusion failures;
- coordination lacking in coastal defense.

To correct some of these shortcomings, Canada's "International Policy Statement on Defence" established that "the Canadian Forces will expand and enhance their information and intelligence fusion capability to better assess large amounts of intelligence in support of military and government decision making"⁵ while also improving "coordination with other government departments and interoperability with allied forces, particularly the United States."⁶


The 9/11 attacks also prompted senior officials from Canada and the United States to create a Canadian and U.S. binational planning group (BPG) through an agreement signed by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State. The BPG did a detailed analysis on enhanced military cooperation⁷ and found that national information sharing was improving within each country in part due to interagency initiatives implemented by United States Northern Command and Canada Command. However, causal factors that contributed to the weaknesses identified in binational intelligence and information sharing included:

- Old agreements, plans, policies and/or mechanisms, had not been updated or renewed on a routine basis, or as the environment changed.
- Organizational cultures and negative inertia that nurtured a "need-to-know" instead of a "need-to-share" mentality.
- Policies had plenty of inhibitors, but few motivators or rewards to enable sharing information.

For instance, the information-sharing agreement between Canada and the United States was signed in 1962, yet it was not updated, despite changes in the threat environment and changes such as creation of the Internet. Similarly, deliberate planning among allies normally serves as a catalyst for sharing information; however, at the time of the 9/11 attacks, the "Land Operation Plan," "Maritime Eastern Operations Plan," and "Maritime Western Operations Plan" were significantly out of date.⁸

These operations plans were stove-piped, which contributed to a "need-to-know" mentality and a lack of information sharing across domains and agencies (for example, these legacy plans were not synchronized with the significant efforts of the United States Coast Guard to secure our coastal waters).

The "9/11 Commission Report" and the "SCONSAD Report" identified the need to improve information sharing among agencies within each country; and the BPG's "Final Report on Enhanced Military



The crew of a 30-foot boat from Station Sault Saint Marie, Mich. patrols the waters separating the United States and Canada. USCG photo by PA1 Harry C. Craft III.

Cooperation" concluded that a similar information sharing problem exists between both countries.

Combined Solution

The key reason for the establishment of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was the increasing speed at which very lethal weapons could be delivered against North America. This meant there was a new requirement for rapid warning and analysis of aerospace threats, and development of binational plans for immediate response,

since there was no longer time for formal negotiations or arrangements. This same compression of warning, analysis, and response time may also exist for our maritime forces.⁹ There may be very little warning of attack from the sea; hence, there is a new need for real-time sharing of information about vessels of interest that are approaching North America.¹⁰ For instance, the warning time for sea-launched cruise missiles may be as little as 10 minutes.

Potential threats can now pose exceedingly complex consequence-management problems that must be considered ahead of time, as there will probably not be sufficient time to consider them during the event. In short, as in aerospace defense, there is no longer enough time to negotiate specific agreements for individual incidents of maritime warning to effectively defend our shores.¹¹

This renewed focus on joint and combined information sharing influenced discussions that were taking place between Foreign Affairs Canada and the U.S. Department of State on renewing the NORAD agreement. In 1958, the NORAD agreement was a revolutionary concept, because it implemented air defense from a continental perspective. Hence, for the past 48 years, NORAD has focused upon the combined aero-

and the United States, adding maritime warning for North America as a new mission. According to the new agreement:

“‘Maritime Warning’ consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating intelligence and information related to the respective maritime areas and internal waterways of, and the maritime approaches to, the United States and Canada, and warning of maritime threats to, or attacks against North America utilizing mutual support arrangements with other commands and agencies, to enable identification, validation, and response by national commands and agencies responsible for maritime defense and security.”¹²

As indicated in this maritime warning definition, NORAD’s new mission is focused upon information sharing between Canada and the United States for potential maritime threats to North American security. Placing this responsibility upon NORAD tightens the information-sharing seam between the aerospace and maritime domains, and reduces the gap that formerly existed between Canadian and American defense and security organizations.

In addition, the expansion of NORAD’s responsibility supports the intent of the U.S. “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004” that identified that the “Federal Government should exchange terrorist information with trusted allies” (Sec 7210), and that the policies, procedures, guidelines, rules, and standards ... shall “address and facilitate, as appropriate, information sharing between Federal departments and agencies with foreign partners and allies” (Sec 1016). Working together for enhanced maritime warning also supports the Secretary of Defense’s “Security Cooperation Guidance,” which emphasizes working with our allies to protect our common interests. Similarly, it supports the “Canadian International Policy Statement on Defense,” which directed Canadian forces to enhance binational defense cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime security with the United States. Hence, developing combined maritime warning is a win-win situation for both governments.

The Way Ahead

Both Canada and the United States have already made great strides in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). The practical MDA focus is an effective understanding of ships, crews, and cargo in the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy and/or environment of Canada and the United States. Now that the governments of Canada and the United States have directed NORAD to



A Navy helicopter passes over Coast Guard Cutter *Shearwater* in Hampton Roads as part of escort operations for the returning carrier *USS Theodore Roosevelt*. USCG photo by PA2 John Masson.

space warning and control of Canada and the United States, and the agreement has been renewed regularly since then, reaffirming our partnership in aerospace defense. On April 28, 2006, the agreement was renewed once again by the governments of Canada

implement maritime warning, the NORAD-NORTHCOM J5 planning staff has entered into a deliberate planning cycle to expand national maritime warning initiatives into a binational context. As part of its adaptive planning cycle, the staff is studying the current processes, products, people, and technology to determine where existing organizations and structures could add synergies to each other's operations, while avoiding duplication of effort.

The NORAD-NORTHCOM J5 planning staff recognizes that it is not possible to look at MDA as a defense-only or a security-only issue, as it transcends Canadian and U.S. borders, domains, defense, transportation and security departments, and agencies. Binational maritime warning must be a joint, combined, and interagency effort that contributes to timely decisions that are essential for success. Therefore, this effort is dependent on effective sharing of information among numerous maritime stakeholders to include, but not limited to:

- NORAD-NORTHCOM Command Center;
- NORAD-NORTHCOM Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center;
- Canada Command's Joint Command Centre;
- Canadian National Defence Command Centre;
- U.S. National Military Command Center;
- Canadian Marine Security Operations Centres;
- Joint Task Force – Pacific (formerly MARPAC);
- Joint Task Force – Atlantic (formerly MARLANT);
- U.S. Coast Guard sectors and areas;
- Fleet Forces Command;
- U.S. National Maritime Intelligence Center;
- U.S. Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Atlantic;
- U.S. Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Pacific; and
- other interagency centers such as Public Safety Emergency Preparedness Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice.

While this list is not all inclusive, it represents the number of organizations and nodes that are involved in defense and security of our maritime approaches. Although the commercial shipping that consists of containerized ships, oil tankers, and the like, as well as pleasure craft add to the complexity of this infor-

mation-sharing mission; the unclassified, open source, and/or commercial information adds to the accuracy and depth of our knowledge. Hence, an implied task is to keep this information unclassified to ensure a strong partnership between the government and private sectors.

Despite these and other challenges, once this maritime warning concept of operations is fully implemented, our nations will significantly improve the timeliness and accuracy of maritime warning. Formalizing our information-sharing architecture will contribute to faster and more effective joint and combined responses to a marine threat or a developing crisis within Canadian and U.S. exclusive economic zones and along our coasts. As a result, this increased cooperation will make our people safer and our economies more secure.

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Endnotes

¹Report from the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation from the 109th U.S. Congress in January 2005, located at: www.house.gov/transportation/cgmt/cgmtjuris.htm and the Department of Transportation (DOT) Marine Transportation System (MTS) Report to Congress, at: <http://www.dot.gov/mts/report/chapters/Introduction.pdf>.

²Bremer Report, National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission) "Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism," June 7, 2000, available at <http://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/>; Gilmore Commission Annual Reports, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (known as the Gilmore Commission) available at www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/; Hart-Rudman Commission Report, U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (known as the Hart-Rudman Commission) available at www.nssg.gov, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report, Washington, D.C., February 15, 2001. The 9-11 Commission Report (9/11 Report): "Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," dated 5 August 2004, available at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911>.

³"The 9-11 Report," pages 321 and 417.

⁴"The 9-11 Report," page 88.

⁵Canadian "International Policy Statement-Defence," page 13.

⁶Canadian "International Policy Statement-Defence," page 12.

⁷All 32 recommendations can be read in the BPG's "Final Report on CANUS Enhanced Military Cooperation," which is available at www.canadianally.com/bpg or www.usembassycanada.gov.

⁸"Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process" (CF OPP), page 5-5.

⁹"Quadrennial Defense Review Report" dated 6 Feb 2006, page 33.

¹⁰QDR, page 25.

¹¹Dwight N. Mason, former U.S. Chair to the PJBD, in "Canadian Defense Priorities: What Might the United States Like to See?" Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Policy Papers on the Americas, Volume XV, Study 1, dated March 2004, at www.csis.org.

¹²North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Agreement dated 28 April 2006.

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